The use of nuclear weapons – whether by accident, miscalculation, crisis escalation or intent – would cause catastrophic medical, humanitarian, environmental, economic and political consequences. Adoption of no-first-use policies, and ending the current military preparations for such use, would considerably lower the risks of a nuclear catastrophe occurring.
No-first-use (NFU) is a commitment to never use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances, whether as a pre-emptive attack or first strike, or in response to a non-nuclear attack of any kind.
China and India have adopted NFU policies. Russia/Soviet Union had such a policy from 1982 to 1993. In contrast, France, North Korea, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States maintain policies that permit the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Israel does not acknowledge the existence of its nuclear arsenal and so has no publicly known position. However, as their nuclear weapons are developed primarily to defend Israel against non-nuclear states (Arab countries and Iran), it is probable that they have not ruled out the first use of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons today are many times more destructive than those used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. A single nuclear weapon could destroy a city and kill most of its people. We invite you to visit Nukemap for an illustration of the destruction of a nuclear bomb dropped on your city. In addition to the loss of lives and property, a nuclear detonation would likely result in profound social, economic and political disruption (See ICRC: Humanitarian impacts and risk of use of nuclear weapons). This could also stimulate further military action including nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if a nuclear armed country was conducting a first strike, they would probably launch multiple nuclear weapons, not just one, in order to destroy military and economic targets, and to try to pre-empt a retaliatory attack against them. Several nuclear explosions against targets in, or close to, modern cities would kill tens of millions of people and could generate climatic consequences that dwarf the climate change we are currently experiencing from carbon emissions. When US President Reagan and Soviet President Gorbachev became aware of the risks and catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons being used, they jointly announced that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. This understanding was reflected by the 192 States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including five nuclear armed States China, France, Russia, UK and USA) in 2010 when they agreed that ‘any use of nuclear weapons’ would have ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences.’ The next step is to ensure that a nuclear war is never fought, through no-first-use commitments.
Policy options for the first-use of nuclear weapons – which are maintained by most of the nuclear-armed states – increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict. They provide a possibility that a nuclear-armed state might launch a nuclear strike in response to a conventional threat or to a threat from other weapons of mass destruction, or even to neutralise a potential nuclear threat in a pre-emptive strike. NFU restricts the possibilities for launching a nuclear strike to only a situation in which a country has been attacked by nuclear weapons.
No. Although no-first-use does not rule out the possibility of a second use in response to a nuclear attack, it does not imply or justify such a second use. Indeed, if a country is attacked by nuclear weapons, the political and military leaders would have to consider what purpose would be gained by a nuclear response, which could make the situation even worse. In addition, no-first-use is a measure that, if adopted by all nuclear-armed states, would rule out any intentional use of nuclear weapons by them. If no-one fires first, then no-one fires (unless there is an accidental launch). It is also an important measure to strengthen the norm against any use of nuclear weapons and a significant step towards a more comprehensive prohibition on any use of nuclear weapons.
Not exactly. Both no-first-use and sole purpose restrict the option of launching a nuclear strike to only those circumstances involving a threat from nuclear weapons. However, sole purpose would provide an option of a pre-emptive first strike against a nuclear threat, while no-first-use would rule out such a pre-emptive strike, providing for a nuclear strike only if one had already been attacked by nuclear weapons. Adoption of sole purpose policies could be seen as an interim step towards no-first-use or a comprehensive prohibition on any use.
Proponents of first-use options argue that these are necessary to protect countries from conventional attack, attack from other weapons of mass destruction and/or the threat of an attack from nuclear weapons. There may be some justification for these perspectives, but they are offset to a large degree by the increased insecurity resulting from the higher risks of a nuclear exchange, and by the increased tensions and conflicts resulting from the nuclear threats posed by policies and preparations for first-use. In addition, the nuclear disarmament obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996, requires countries relying on the threat or use of nuclear weapons to replace this with other forms of security in order to facilitate nuclear disarmament. Adoption of no-first-use policies can be undertaken in conjunction with other confidence-building and common security measures in order to ensure that they do not diminish the security of the nuclear-armed and allied states.
No. Quite the opposite. If nuclear armed and allied states adopt no-first-use policies, it brings them one step closer to a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons such as the TPNW or a separately negotiated nuclear weapons convention.
Maintaining first-use policies prevent the nuclear armed states from participating in good faith processes for nuclear abolition, because the first-use option means that they believe that they need to retain nuclear weapons for a wide range of security scenarios – not just to deter a nuclear attack.
If they adopt no-first-use or sole purpose policies, it means that their nuclear arsenals are considered necessary only to counter the nuclear weapons of others. They can therefore enter into negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament, as long as these negotiations include the establishment of robust and effective verification and enforcement measures to ensure that all nuclear-armed states disarm, disable and destroy their nuclear weapons according to an agreed timeframe. Even if no-first-use policies don’t immediately result in negotiations for complete elimination of nuclear weapons, they would serve as a “confidence-building measure” that establishes greater trust among nuclear-armed countries, making it easier to work together to reduce nuclear risks and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.
Yes. In the USA there is draft legislation in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to enshrine no-first-use into US law. President Biden has indicated support for at least sole purpose, if not no-first-use. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (which comprises the legislatures of France, Russia, UK, USA and all the European and former Soviet countries) has adopted resolutions supporting no-first-use. This has given rise to new momentum amongst civil society, especially in the US, to advance no-first-use policies.
Yes. It is easy to understand and support. Regardless of people’s differing perspectives on nuclear deterrence, anyone can support the call on nuclear armed states to never initiate a nuclear exchange by launching a first strike.
For more Q&A on no-first-use, see Global Zero No-First-Use FAQs.
For more in-depth discussion on no-first-use see the bibliography and blog articles, which include an option for comments and questions on the issues raised in the articles.
Policy options for the first-use of nuclear weapons – which are maintained by most of the nuclear-armed states – increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict. They provide a possibility that a nuclear-armed state might launch a nuclear strike in response to a conventional threat or to a threat from other weapons of mass destruction, or even to neutralise a potential nuclear threat in a pre-emptive strike. NFU restricts the possibilities for launching a nuclear strike to only a situation in which a country has been attacked by nuclear weapons.
Policy options for the first-use of nuclear weapons – which are maintained by most of the nuclear-armed states – increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict. They provide a possibility that a nuclear-armed state might launch a nuclear strike in response to a conventional threat or to a threat from other weapons of mass destruction, or even to neutralise a potential nuclear threat in a pre-emptive strike. NFU restricts the possibilities for launching a nuclear strike to only a situation in which a country has been attacked by nuclear weapons.
Policy options for the first-use of nuclear weapons – which are maintained by most of the nuclear-armed states – increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict. They provide a possibility that a nuclear-armed state might launch a nuclear strike in response to a conventional threat or to a threat from other weapons of mass destruction, or even to neutralise a potential nuclear threat in a pre-emptive strike. NFU restricts the possibilities for launching a nuclear strike to only a situation in which a country has been attacked by nuclear weapons.